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Livestock and Products,
 Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
  35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb.. . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
  Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef, 
  600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
  Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,   
  51-52% Lean.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., Heavy,
  Wooled, South Dakota, Direct. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
  FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$90.46
130.05
     *
156.70
79.24
  
82.67
130.00
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$108.07
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176.83
93.26
    97.01
       *
401.04
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146.62
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94.66
   
93.03
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Crops, 
 Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu. . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.52
3.46
9.72
5.50
2.68
8.19
7.55
13.99
12.05
3.64
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6.90
13.33
11.07
3.58
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
  Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
  Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
  Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
  Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture, 
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture, 
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
150.00
     *
     *
94.50
33.50
140.00
90.00
       *
215.00
80.50
140.00
87.50
72.50
202.50
67.50
*No Market
This is the second in a series of three Cornhusker
Economics articles on the institutions governing the
ownership, use and transfer of agricultural land around the
world. Last week, the focus was on the difficult transition
from social to private land ownership in the countries of the
Former Soviet Union. This week, the issue concerns the
recent increase in land purchases in Africa by foreign
governments and firms, referred to by some as a new
colonial land grab.
Beginning in late 2007 world food prices began to
increase dramatically, and after a short respite beginning in
the second half of 2008, have recently resumed their
upward march. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
food price index showed that food prices in May 2011 were
87 percent higher than they were in 2005, with prices for
most cereal grains and oilseeds much higher than that. See:
http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/Table1.pdf
In countries with limited land resources (e.g., China,
Saudi Arabia, Switzerland), some have concluded that a
sensible strategy for reducing their vulnerability to rising
food prices is to purchase or lease land in the land-rich
countries of Africa or Latin America, for use in producing
agricultural commodities for the home country. For the low-
income countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), these
investments could pay off if they lead to agricultural
development and the creation of jobs.
On the other hand, many countries in SSA have
ambiguous or poorly defined land ownership rights,
allowing corrupt governments and foreign investors to enter
into deals that are of little benefit to rural Africans or to
overall national development. In Mali for example, the
government struck a bargain with the government of Libya,
transferring control of land that had been farmed under
traditional land tenure arrangements for centuries, with no
compensation for the displaced villagers (New York Times,
December 21, 2010). A report in The Economist (May 7,
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2011) included the story of some farmers in Central Sierra
Leone who had entered into a 50-year lease with a Swiss
company that intended to grow crops for biofuels. The
promised jobs and rural development programs associated
with this deal never materialized. Lester Brown has
reported that land purchases in Sudan and Ethiopia by
China, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and other high-income
or emerging countries have resulted in diversions of water
from the upper reaches of the Nile River, threatening
Egypt’s ability to feed its people (New York Times, June 1,
2011). A 2010 World Bank report entitled “Rising Global
Interest in Farmland” called attention to violations of
traditional land rights in many of these large foreign land
purchases.    
Traditional land rights governed by village-level
authorities are still prevalent in much of SSA. In some
regions, property laws created by European authorities
during the colonial era have been incorporated into
national legislation. These statutory rights generally define
land ownership in cities and the nearby countryside. As
one moves away from the large cities, land ownership is
more likely to be governed by customary rights. Between
these two zones there is often a buffer region, with
conflicting and unclear land tenure rules (U.N. Economic
Commission for Africa, 2004). This creates room for
opportunistic behavior, leading to land grabs and other
inequitable transactions. It is also frequently the case that
the governments of countries in SSA claim ultimate
ownership of all the land in the country, and as in the case
of the deal in Mali, sometimes sell parcels of land out from
under their traditional owners.  
The problem is made even worse because the
prevailing enforcement mechanisms tend to be biased
towards the rich and powerful for settlements governed by
statutory law, and towards chiefs and traditional elders in
rural communities subject to customary institutions. Either
way, the poor and less influential are likely to lose out.
Most customary rules distribute land based on caste,
seniority and gender, prohibiting women from owning land
(U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, 2003). This
accounts for the prevailing inequality in land tenure across
gender, despite the fact that women do most of the farm
work in Africa. Customary systems also lead to land
fragmentation, as land cannot be bought and sold freely
when it is held communally. The result is small farm
holdings and low productivity.
In addition to the potential adverse effects of poorly
defined property rights on the well-being of low-income
farm households, such ill-defined rights also lead to
lowered incentives for farmers to invest in land
improvements and other productivity-enhancing
innovations. Lower agricultural productivity often has an
impact on overall economic growth. A preliminary
statistical analysis shows that South Africa, Botswana and
Mauritius are substantially different from 14 other SSA
countries. They not only have more favorable property
rights regimes, but also a higher Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). The World Bank report does point to potential
benefits from foreign direct investment in land in SSA, as
long as the laws and regulations governing such
transactions are designed to promote mutual benefits for
investors and the country itself, and as long as the
traditional rights of individual families are respected. Given
World Bank estimates that land deals in 2009 covered over
110 million acres, it is important for the governments of
developing countries to make clear and equitable land
property rights a high development priority.   
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